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Accepting the Unacceptable: How Jama v. Immigration




Imagine an alien so fearful for his or her life that they are forced
to leave the country they were born in, the country of their ancestry,
and the country of their citizenship, in order to seek refuge in the
United States and escape death. The alien comes to the United States
and commits a crime, whether under their own volition or not, which
renders them removable by the United States Government. They do
not indicate a country of choice, so the Attorney General elects to
return them to the country of their origin - the very country they fled
years back because of the imminence of death. Imagine the
confusion and fear of that alien, now being told by the United States
government that they are being returned to that country against their
will, regardless of whether the government of that country is willing
to accept them.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Jama v. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement affects the Government's authority to elect destination
countries when deciding where to deport removable aliens.1 This
note will explore the Jama decision. Part II details the procedural
history of the case. 2 Part III details and sets forth the facts of the
case.3 Part IV analyzes the majority opinion by Justice Scalia, as
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Pepperdine University School of Law, B.A. Wheaton
College. I would like to thank my friends and family, especially Juliette, because
without her support and patience this article would never have been completed.
1. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005).
2. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
3. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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well as the dissenting opinion by Justice Souter. 4 Part V considers
Jama's judicial, administrative and social impact. 5 Finally, Part VI
concludes the discussion of Jama and the deportation policy.6
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
According to the statutory definition, an alien is "any person not a
citizen or national of the United States."7 There are many different
options for citizens or residents of foreign countries to acquire alien
status in the United States.' An alien who has been lawfully admitted
into the United States, however, is subject to removal due to the
commission of a criminal act.9 The aforementioned statute, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227, states: "Any alien who is convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of
admission . . . is deportable."' 0 In the modem history of the United
4. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
5. See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
6. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(3) (2005).
8. See Form 1-485, "Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust
Status," available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/i-485.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2006). For example, a non-citizen may be eligible for permanent
alien status within the United States if they are a family member, spouse or fianc6
of a citizen of the United States, or if their employer has filed an application on
their behalf. Id. It is also very common, as was the petitioner's situation in this
case, for those seeking asylum or refugees who fled to the United States to seek
permanent alien status after one year of residence. Id. There are a myriad of ways
to gain alien status within the United States, such as diversity visa lotteries, which
pertain to specific non-citizens and their unique situations. Id.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2005). According to § 1227, any alien convicted of a
crime is subject to order of removal by the Attorney General. Id. Aliens are
deemed to have no rights to remain in the United States, and Congress retains the
authority to remove them from the United States at any time. Marcello v. Ahrens,
212 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 1954). Congress also has the authority to order the
deportation of aliens whose presence in the United States is deemed detrimental to
its citizens, and may do so by instigating the necessary executive proceedings. Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280 (1922). As Justice Jackson stated, the ability
to remove and deport aliens that behave contrary to our national ideals is "a
weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent
in every sovereign state." Harisides v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1951).
10. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). A crime of moral turpitude is defined as an act that
"shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary
States, various statutory provisions have granted the authority to
tackle the large issue of alien removal and deportation." One major
debate over the past century has been whether or not the United
States must obtain the explicit acceptance of the acquiring country's
government before removing a deportable alien. The following
historical background will sketch the evolution and development of
the acceptance requirement and the role it has played in removing
aliens from the United States.
A. Immigration Act of 1917
Since the late 1800's and after the Civil War, there have been
numerous changes in the statutory authority governing the issue of
immigration, as well as the perceived effects of immigration. In
1875, the Supreme Court decided that the issue of immigration would
no longer be state-governed, but rather would be delegated to the
federal government.' 2  Over the next few decades, the federal
government passed various pieces of legislation to deal with the
influx of immigrants and the economic problems caused by the
laissez faire immigration policy.' 3  In 1917, Congress passed the
to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's
fellow man or society in general." Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 227 (4th
Cir. 2001). This concept of moral turpitude has existed in immigration cases for
over a century. Id. See also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (describing
the history of the term "moral turpitude," which was first used in the Act of March
3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891)).
11. See Tim Schepers, Note, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? US. Alien
Deportation and the Requirement of Acceptance in Jama v. LN.S., 28 HAMLINE L.
REV. 387 (2005) (providing a limited background to the evolution of immigration
and alien removal statues in United States history).
12. A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 305 (George T. Kurian
ed., Oxford Press 1998) (1998). Until the Chy Lung v. Freeman decision, the
United States had a policy of accepting virtually free and open immigration. Id.
(citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). Any immigration policy that
was created before the Supreme Court delegated the responsibility to the Federal
government was asserted autonomously by individual states. Center for
Immigration Studies, History, http://www.cis.org/topics/history.html (last visited
April 15, 2006).
13. Kurian, supra note 12, at 305. Because the economic situations in many
of the areas that experienced high immigration were adversely impacted, Congress
began to issue various Acts in an attempt to counteract the problem. Id. Before the
Immigration Act of 1917, these Acts generally focused on excluding certain
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Immigration Act of 1917; in addition to setting forth a lengthy list of
those classes excluded from immigration and detailing the taxes
imposed by immigration, the 1917 Act also codified the policies
regarding alien deportation. 4 The Immigration Act of 1917 was one
of the first comprehensive pieces of national legislation to detail both
the reasons for deportation and the actual process of removal for
deportable aliens.' 5
In the years after the Immigration Act of 1917 was codified, there
were several cases handed down dealing with alien deportation and
categories of immigrants. For example, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, along
with the Alien Contract Labor Acts of 1885 and 1887, specified certain groups of
immigrant workers that were prohibited from immigrating to the United States. Id.
(citing Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 28 Stat. 1893-94 (1882) (amended 1884),
repealed by Magnuson Act, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943); Alien Contract Labor
Acts 23 Stat. 332 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2164 (1901)), superseded by Act of Mar.
3, 1903, Pub. L. No. 162, 32 Stat. 1213. Also, the Immigration Act of 1882
disallowed such groups as "idiots, lunatics and convicts" from entering the country.
Id. (citing Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882)). Until 1892, the
government attempted to enforce immigration laws through the auspices of the
U.S. Treasury, primarily through the customs system already in place. Id. In 1892,
with the implementation and utilization of Ellis Island, located in New York
Harbor, the government put into effect its first national immigration policy, which
evolved into that which we enforce today. Id.
14. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). Codifying
the deportation policy, this Act stated that "the deportation of aliens provided for in
this Act shall, at the option of the Secretary of Labor, be to the country whence
they came, or to the foreign port at which such aliens embarked for the United
States ..... Id. at 890. The Act implies a necessary degree of acceptance by
stating:
[O]r if such aliens are held by the country from which they
entered the United States not to be subjects or citizens of such
country, and such country refuses to permit their reentry, or
imposes any condition upon permitting reentry, then to the
country of which such aliens are subjects or citizens, or to the
country in which they resided prior to entering the country from
which they entered the United States.
Id. Such language implies that there was an inherent requirement of acceptance in
order to remove an alien to the country of their citizenship or birth, and if such
acceptance was not offered another country would be selected that would accept
the alien. See United States ex rel. Hudak v. Uhl, 20 F. Supp. 928 (N.D.N.Y. 1937)
(holding that the United States can deport an alien to the country of his birth
without question, a power which is limited only by native sovereignty's refusal to
receive him).
15. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 301.
whether acceptance by the receiving country's government was
required. In Hajdamacha v. Karnuth, the Western District Court of
New York ruled that the Secretary of Labor had the sovereign
authority, absent alien input, to elect the country of deportation, and
would only change that election if the country did not accept the
deported alien. 6 Also, in United States ex rel. Hudak v. Uhl, the
Eastern District Court of New York ruled that the United States could
remove any alien deemed necessary without question; however the
receiving state had the ultimate right to refuse the alien.' 7 These
cases imply a requirement of acceptance from the receiving country
before deportation can be completed. Although not expressly stated,
the fact that both decisions relate to scenarios where the receiving
country does not accept the alien, therefore requiring the Secretary of
Labor to identify another country for deportation purposes, implies
that an acceptance requirement should be read into the statutory
language.
B. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952: The McCarran-Walter
Act
In an effort to re-codify and consolidate all of the pre-existing
16. Hajdamacha v. Karnuth, 23 F.2d 956, 958 (W.D.N.Y. 1927). Here, the
District Court judge stated:
[t]he relator should be sent, not politely permitted to go as he
pleases, to St. Nazaire, whence he sailed, or to France generally,
whence he came, or, if France refuses him, to Mesopotamia,
where he resided before he abode in France, or to Persia, the
country of which he is a citizen.
Id. at 958 (quoting United States ex rel. Karamian v. Curran, 16 F.2d 958, 961 (2nd
Cir. 1927)); see also Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F.2d 13, 16 (9th Cir. 1931)
(setting forth the language of the Immigration Act of 1917 and requiring that the
deportation be made in accordance to its statutory provisions).
17. Hudak, 20 F. Supp. at 929. In this case, District Court Judge Cooper
opined that the Secretary of Labor had complete authority in selecting the country
to which the alien would be deported. Id. However, he stated that the only limit on
the Secretary's authority was the country's native sovereignty to refuse the alien's
return, which would be absolute in the absence of a treaty. Id. He further stated
that the alien had no right to contest the location of deportation in the courts of the
United States. Id. Therefore, although there is no literal wording requiring
acceptance from the receiving country's government, the court's decision implies
that acceptance from the country is necessary to remove the alien.
Spring 2006 Acceptin2 the Unacceptable
164 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 26-1
immigration and naturalization policies, in 1952 Congress enacted
the Immigration and Nationality Act, or the McCarran-Walter Act.18
The McCarran-Walter of 1952 is written differently than the
Immigration Act of 1917, setting forth different policies and practices
for deporting aliens from the United States. 19 The different policies
regarding deportation of aliens were significantly broadened, giving a
wider range of deportation locations as well as more opportunity for
the alien to elect the country that received him.20 However, greater
18. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, 82 Pub. L. 414, 66
Stat. 163, 212 (1952) (amended 1996). For purposes of clarification, the 1952 Act
shall be referred to as the "McCarran-Walter Act," and the current Act shall be
referred to as the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").
19. Id. at 212-13. Compare Immigration Act of 1917 with the McCarran-
Walter Act of 1952. The differences in language and policy are quite different in
the 1952 Act. Primarily, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 sets forth a three-step
process that separates the deportation process into different scenarios, each being
governed by specific provision. Id. The first step allows the alien to suggest a
country of their election to the Attorney General who will deport them, subject to
various limitations and provided "that country is willing to accept him into its
territory ...... Id. at 212. If the country the alien has elected refuses his
admittance, the next step directs the Attorney General to focus the deportation on
"any country of which such alien is a subject national, or citizen if such country is
willing to accept him into its territory." Id. The first two steps of the deportation
process, as written in the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, explicitly make the ability
to deport contingent on prior acceptance of the receiving country's government.
See McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. The third step, which is used if the country
fails to give the Attorney General reasonable notice as to whether or not they will
accept the alien, authorizes the Attorney General to use discretion to select a
country for deportation; this step provides suggestions to assist the Attorney
General in making the country selection. McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. The third
step of the deportation section is the most ambiguous with respect to the acceptance
requirement; therefore, it produces various readings when interpreted by the courts.
Seven possible locations for deportation are described in this step; however, only
the language of the seventh step explicitly requires the acceptance of the receiving
country. Id. at 213. That provision reads "if deportation to any of the foregoing
places or countries is impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible, then to any country
which is willing to accept such alien into its territory." Id. The fact that this is the
only provision that requires prior acceptance by the receiving country causes
confusion when determining whether or not the previous six provisions also require
acceptance or if the Attorney General has complete discretion.
20. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The difference in direct alien
participation regarding the selection of the country of deportation was greatly
broadened in the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952. McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 at
212. See supra note 19 for additional information on the McCarran-Walter Act of
inconsistencies in interpretation when such procedures were
reviewed in courts of law came along with these broader provisions
regulating deportation procedures.
Following the consolidation of immigration and naturalization
policies into the McCarran-Walter of 1952, the courts struggled with
interpreting the third step of the Act, which gave the Attorney
General the discretion to elect from seven different deportation
provisions. In United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an alien cannot be deported to a
non-accepting country under step three of § 243 because there is an
implicit acceptance requirement governing all seven provisions of the
INA.2 1 In most cases interpreting the third step of § 243, courts
frequently cite the language set forth by Judge Learned Hand in Tom
Man, or simply read the actual language of the statutory provision to
find that acceptance is a necessary requirement.22 However, in an
1952. In the earlier Immigration Act of 1917, an alien was prohibited from
suggesting a potential country and from contesting the election made by the
Secretary of Labor. Immigration Act of 1917. In stark contrast, the McCarran-
Walter Act of 1952 gives the alien an opportunity to elect the country he wishes to
be deported to, subject to the approval of the Attorney General and the country
itself. McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.
21. United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, 264 F.2d 926, 928 (2d Cir. 1959).
In this case, the subject was a native of China; the action was brought because he
overstayed the permissible amount of time for a foreign seaman to remain ashore.
Id. at 927. Upon commencement of deportation hearings, the subject specified that
he wished to be removed to the country of Formosa. Id. Despite the National
Chinese Government's refusal to accept him, the Attorney General decided to
remove him to the mainland of China. Id. at 928. However, because the Attorney
General had not inquired beforehand whether China would admit him, he was not
removed there. Id. The court in Tom Man then stated that the third step of §
243(a) provided seven options, and that the subject would be covered by at least
three. Id. However, in the opinion of Judge Learned Hand, "we think that
deportation under any of these is subject to the condition expressed in the seventh
subdivision: i.e. that the 'country' shall be 'willing to accept' him 'into its
territory." Id. Since the Tom Man decision in 1959, § 243 of the McCarran-Walter
Act of 1952has been amended and codified in § 1231(b)(2)(E) of the current
Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(2)(E) (2005). However, it
has remained relatively unchanged.
22. See Horn Sin v. Esperdy, 209 F. Supp. 3, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (holding that
the alien could not be deported to mainland China under step three without
preliminary inquiry because "deportation may not be effected unless the country is
'willing to accept him into its territory'); United States ex rel. Wong Kan Wong v.
Esperdy, 197 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (interpreting the statutory language of
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administrative hearing held by the Board of Immigration Appeals
("Board"), the Board interpreted the third step of § 243 as not
requiring preliminary acceptance by the country to which the alien is
being deported. In the Matter of Niesel, the Board held that the
removal of the respondent was subject to step three of the INA of
1952, and that the first six provisions under that step did not require
advance acceptance from the country selected for deportation.23
Although there are more court decisions interpreting the third step of
§ 243 as requiring an underlying notion of acceptance for all seven
provisions, it is evident that courts and judges remained unclear as to
which provisions the acceptance requirement actually applied.
§ 243 and prior case law to require the Attorney General to receive acceptance
from the receiving country before the deportation takes place); and Lu v. Rogers,
164 F. Supp. 320, 322 (D.D.C. 1958) (holding that "without communist China's
expression of 'willingness to accept him,' the statute will not permit plaintiffs
deportation to that country"). In addition to the case law and statutory
interpretation, many courts have weighed issues of diplomacy in deciding the issue
of whether the Attorney General can deport to a country without explicit
acceptance under step three of this section. See, e.g., Cheng, Pun Hoi v. I.N.S., 521
F.2d 1351, 1353 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that "[n]ormally, the United States does not
deport aliens to countries with whose governments we do not have diplomatic
relations") and Amanullah v. Cobb, 862 F.2d 362, 368 (1st Cir. 1988) (Coffin, J.,
concurring) (stating that it is "sheer folly to send an alien into another country
without any indication that the country will receive the alien, or... where there is
explicit notice that it will not receive the individual").
23. In re Matter of Niesel, 10 I. & N. Dec. 57, 59 (B.I.A. 1962). In this case,
the alien was found deportable because of a § 241(a)(2) violation and for remaining
longer than authorized on a temporary visa. Id. at 57. Upon reaching step one of
the hearing procedures, the respondent refused to elect a country to which she
wanted to be deported. Id. The second step was precluded because Niesel was an
East German national, but did not want to be removed there. Additionally, the
United States did not recognize it as a legitimate government, which further
precluded this step. Id. at 58. Finally, the Attorney General used his discretion and
elected West Germany as the country for deportation. However the respondent's
counsel argued that preliminary acceptance was required before removal. Id. The
Board rejected this argument, claiming that:
[w]hen designating a country in step three as a place of
deportation, there is no requirement that preliminary inquiry be
addressed to the country to which deportation is ordered (other
than perhaps to the seventh country in the list - a country which
is willing to accept the alien into its territory).
Id. at 59 (citing Lu, 164 F. Supp. at 320). The court concluded that "[i]n the instant
case, this preliminary inquiry is not required." Matter of Niesel, 10 I. & N. at 59.
C. The Current Immigration and Nationality Act
The current Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which has
been amended a number of times since the codification of the 1952
version, was created as a result of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).24 Although it did not
significantly change the substance of the policies, one of the more
noticeable changes was the merger of the removal procedures for
deportable and excludable aliens, which are now both contained in 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b). 25 Located in §1231(b)(2) of the current INA, the
processes and procedures governing the deportation of aliens is the
section of the statute that has caused the most confusion regarding
the interpretation of an "acceptance" requirement. Section
1231 (b)(2) defines a three-step process for determining the country to
which an alien will be deported.26 The first step of the statute allows
the alien to elect a country of removal, subject to certain limitations
regarding location, where the Attorney General shall deport the
24. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) ("IIRIA"). The IIRIRA was enacted on
September 30, 1996, in order to enhance the I.N.S.' presence and reorganize the
process and provisions located within the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952. Id. There have been various minor amendments, which have made little
substantive changes to the current language of the INA. See, e.g., INA
amendments, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957); INA amendments, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); Refugee Act of 1980, 96 Pub. L. No. 212, 94 Stat.
102 (1980); 1NA amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611 (1981);
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 100 Stat. 1214 (1996); and Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
25. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b) (2005) with McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 at
200. The McCarren-Walter Act separates the Exclusion Provisions from the
Deportation Provisions, the former being located in § 236 and the latter in § 243.
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 at 212. In the current version of the INA, the
exclusion provisions and procedures are found in § 1231 (b)(1) and the deportation
provisions and procedures are found within § 1231(b)(2). § 1231(b)(1)-(2).
Although the organization of the provisions is different than that of the original, the
content has remained substantively similar. See also Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873,
883 n.3 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that '[e]xcept for minor editorial revisions, the 1990
version is essentially unchanged from the original 1952 version").
26. § 123 1(b)(2) (2005).
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alien.2 7 If for some reason the alien is not deportable to the country
selected under step one, the second step of the process authorizes the
Attorney General to remove the alien to "a country of which the alien
is a subject, national, or citizen ... ."28 The final step of the process,
and the one that has caused confusion in its interpretation with
regards to the acceptance requirement, only becomes relevant if the
removal is not fulfilled under the first two steps. The interpretation
of step three, § 123 1(b)(2)(E) of the INA, is the crux of the Jama v.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement case.29 The third step of §
1231 (b)(2) states that:
(E) Additional removal countries. If an alien is not
removed to a country under the previous sub-
paragraphs of this paragraph, the Attorney General
shall remove the alien to any of the following
countries:
(i) The country from which the alien was admitted to
the United States.
27. Id. Under this step of the statute, the alien may select one country where
they would want to be removed. Id. Also, the limitations on designation revolve
around contiguous lands and adjacent islands, which are only selectable if the alien
is a native, citizen, subject or national of said land or island, or has previously
resided there. Id. Additionally, the Attorney General has the authority to disregard
the designation for reasons such as delay in selection, delay in acceptance from the
government of the elected country (after thirty days), lack of acceptance from the
country's government, or other diplomatic reasons that would render the removal
detrimental to the United States. Id.
28. Id. The Attorney General has the power to elect the country, provided it
that fits into the statutory language governing this step, unless the country's
government fails to confirm their acceptance within thirty days or another
reasonable time, or if the country explicitly refused acceptance of the alien. Id.
This step of § 1231(b)(2), like the first step, carries an explicit acceptance
requirement within the statute itself. Id. It is clear from the statutory language that
removal under either section is contingent upon acceptance, and therefore the
deportation cannot be fulfilled if such acceptance is lacking. Id.
29. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005). The
parties in Jama v. ICE both agreed that the petitioner's removal destination was
subject to the implementation of the third step of § 1231. Jama v. I.N.S., 329 F.3d
630 (8th Cir. 2003).
(ii) The country in which is located the foreign port
from which the alien left for the United States or for a
foreign territory contiguous to the United States.
(iii) A country in which the alien resided before the
alien entered the country from which the alien entered
the United States.
(iv) The country in which the alien was born.
(v) The country that had sovereignty over the alien's
birthplace when the alien was born.
(vi) The country in which the alien's birthplace is
located when the alien is ordered removed.
(vii) If impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible to
remove the alien to each country described in a
previous clause of this subparagraph, another country
whose government will accept the alien into that
country.3 0
30. § 123 1(b)(2)(E). The main dispute arises when interpreting whether or not
the acceptance requirement, which is explicit in steps one and two, as well as in the
seventh provision under the third step, should be implied to govern over each of the
other six provisions of step three. Compare Jama, 329 F.3d at 630 (holding that
acceptance is not required under the first six clauses of step three, but is confined to
clause seven) with Ali, 346 F.3d at 873 (holding that clauses one through six of §
1231(b)(2)(E) require the same acceptance requirement as clause seven). The
differences between the current section of exclusion and deportation procedures
and the former section in the INA of 1952 are slight and have little more effect than
organizational structure. Compare § 1231(b)(2) with McCarren-Walter Act of
1952. However, one important alteration arises in clause seven of step three,
deemed the catchall clause. Id. Under the McCarren-Walter Act, that clause read
"if deportation to any of the foregoing place or countries is impracticable,
inadvisable, or impossible, then to any country which is willing to accept such alien
.... " McCarren-Walter Act of 1952. There is a slight difference in the language
of the current version of the INA, where that clause reads then to "another country
whose government will accept the alien." § 123 l(b)(2)(E)(vii). See Jama, 543 U.S.
at 343 n.3 (holding that addition of the word "another" in clause seven of step three
is "attributable to nothing more than stylistic preference"). The petitioner in Jama
proffers an argument that this change in the current version of the statute must
signify that Congress meant "another country whose government will accept the
alien," thus reading an acceptance argument into clauses one through six. Id. at
341. However, writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected this argument,
citing basic concepts of statutory interpretation, as well as the fact that the word
was substituted "simply to rule out the countries already tried .... " Id. at 341.
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Since the re-codification and reorganization of the current
McCarren-Walter Act, the ambiguity found within the third step of
§1231(b)(2) has led to a significant split between the Eighth and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. In Jama v. Immigration and
Naturalization Services, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the applicable portion of the statute should be interpreted as written,
and therefore should not include an acceptance requirement for
clauses one through six of §1231(b)(2)(E). 31  However, in Ali v.
Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that acceptance is
implicitly required for all removals, even those occurring under the
auspices of step three of § 123 1(b)(2).32 Because of this circuit split,
31. Jama, 329 F.3d at 634. In this case, the alien was a refugee of Somalia
who became deportable after committing a third degree assault, deemed by the
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) to be a crime of moral turpitude.
Id. at 631. Here, the parties agreed that Jama's removal was contingent upon step
three of the removal process, so the court focused on §1231(b)(2)(E). Id. at 633.
The INS claimed that there was no acceptance requirement when dealing within
clauses one through six of step three, and because there are explicit acceptance
requirements in steps one and two, as well as clause seven of step three, one should
not be implied here. Id. at 634. However, Jama relied on Tom Man and the cases
that followed its reasoning to posit that the acceptance requirement of clause seven
applies to the preceding six. Id. (citing Tom Man, 264 F.2d at 928). The Eighth
Circuit opinion, written by Judge Arnold, rejected Jama's argument, claiming that
the cases he cited "disregard the plain language of the statute itself .... " Jama,
329 F.3d at 634. Judge Arnold opines that "as [a]matter of simple statutory syntax
and geometry, the acceptance requirement is confined to clause (vii), and does not
apply to clauses (i) through (vi)." Id. The opinion concludes by stating that
"Congress is free to fix the statute if it needs fixing, and Congress knows how to do
so if it wishes." Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit takes on one side of the split in
interpreting the statute quite literally. In reading only the words included within
the clauses, the Eighth Circuit found no requirement of acceptance in clauses one
through six of step three.
32. Ali, 346 F.3d at 881. Here, the petitioners were natives and citizens of
Somalia. Id. at 877. Each was ordered to be deported from the United States at
different times between 2000 and 2001. Id. However, each had been removed
from the INS because returning them to Somalia was impossible due to the
country's lack of a functioning government. Id. Upon renewed developments for
their removal to Somalia, the petitioners sought to enjoin the removal on the basis
that Somalia could not explicitly accept them, because there was no central
government capable of doing so. Id. The INS argued that the literal language of
step three of §1231(b)(2)(E), clauses one through six specifically, authorize the
Attorney General to remove them without acceptance from the country's
government. Id. at 881. However, the court, in an opinion by Judge Tashima,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether or not an
acceptance requirement must be implied in clauses one through six of
§ 1231 (b)(2)(E).
D. Fundamentals of Statutory Interpretation
In order to properly interpret the text of the McCarren-Walter
Act, and fully grasp the difficulties experienced by the Circuit Courts
in ascertaining its meaning, one must appreciate general
fundamentals of statutory interpretation. Courts use general legal
concepts and procedures when ascertaining the meaning of a statute.
One of the most basic tenets is that, when statutory language is
concluded that acceptance was implicitly required for all removals. Id. The court
reasoned that "to read § 1231 (b)(2)(E)(i)-(vi) as not requiring acceptance by the
foreign government would render §1231(b)(2)(C) and (D) superfluous in the
majority of instances .... " Id. It concluded by stating that "[tihe only logical
interpretation of the plain meaning that gives effect to all sections of the statute is
one that requires government acceptance from 'additional' countries listed in
§ 123 l(b)(2)(E)(i-vi)." Id. The majority's opinion continues by analyzing factors
that were not considered by the Eighth Circuit in Jama. Id. at 884-85. One such
factor was INS Policy and Regulation, which explains how the INS' interpretation
of the statute in this case is not consistent with their policy. INS policy states that
"'deportation cannot be effected until travel documentation has been obtained'
from the country to which the alien is to be deported." Id. at 884 (quoting INS
Instructions 243.1, available at http://www.immigration.gov). The Ninth Circuit
also analyzed various tenets of international law, including the United States Policy
with Respect to the Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger of Subjection to
Torture, which states:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite,
or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a
country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture,
regardless of whether the person is physically present in the
United States.
Ali, 346 F.3d at 886. (citing United States Policy with Respect to the Involuntary
Return of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture, Pub. L. .No. 105-277, §
2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998)). Thus, the Ninth Circuit assumes the
opposite side of the split and uses the surrounding text of the statute, along with
extrinsic evidence of INS and international policies, to color their decision that all
deportations and removals require implicit acceptance.
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ambiguous, courts will turn first to the plain meaning of the statute. 33
Many statutes illustrate the interpretation maxim "expression unius
est exclusio alterius," or "expression of the one is the exclusion of
the other."34 Following the concept of analyzing the plain language,
it is imperative that "[c]ourts are obligated to refrain from
embellishing statutes by inserting language that Congress has opted
to omit."
35
However, even if the statute appears clear on its face and the
plain meaning is ascertainable, courts will often utilize interpretation
principles that guide the meaning toward a particular policy. For
example, most courts will not "interpret statutory text in a manner
which leads to absurd results."3 6 Also, with respect to international
law, most courts will not interpret a statute in a manner that
contradicts or overrides internationally accepted law or policy.3 7
Following these general tenets of statutory interpretation, courts
attempt to ascertain a meaning from ambiguous statutes that is
33. United States v. Milk, 281 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
plain language of the statute itself must be looked to, which is "the starting point in
any question of statutory interpretation.").
34. Jama, 329 F.3d at 634. This maxim is well illustrated in Jama case,
because Congress drafted an acceptance requirement into the first two steps, and
also clause seven of step three, without drafting one into clauses one through six.
Id. Therefore, by applying the logic of the statute, the fact that "Congress did not
insert an acceptance requirement into the self-contained provisions that appear in
clauses (i) through (vi)," but did include such a requirement in the surrounding
clauses and steps, means that an acceptance requirement should not be read into
clauses one through six. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Root v. New Liberty Hosp. Dist., 209 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th
Cir. 2000)). Applying this concept in Jama v. INS, the Eighth Circuit opined that
"Congress did not write the statute that way." Jama, 329 F.3d at 634 (quoting
United States v. Naftalian, 441 U.S. 768, 773 (1999)).
36. Id. at 636 (Bye, J., dissenting) (quoting Rowley v. Yamall, 22 F.3d 190,
192 (8th Cir. 1994)). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bye illustrates this maxim
by showing that, if there explicit, literal acceptance requirement, it is possible for
the United States to deport aliens to countries who are not willing to accept them.
Id. at 636. He continues "[t]hose deportees can attest to the practical difficulty, if
not impossibility, of acting anyway when a request is refused." Id.
37. Ali, 346 F.3d at 886. The Court stated that "[a]lthough Congress may
override international law in enacting a statute, we do not presume that Congress
had such an intent when the statute can reasonably be reconciled with the law of
nations." Id. (quoting Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 n.30 (9th Cir.
2001)).
complimentary to Congress' intentions and coincides with general
policy.
III. CASE HISTORY
Keyse Jama was born in the country of Somalia and is currently a
citizen of that country.38 When Jama was twelve years old, his
family fled to Kenya in order to escape the inter-tribal warfare
ravaging Somalia.39  While living in Kenya, his family received
refugee status and was admitted to the United States.40 In 2000,
Jama's refugee status was terminated by reason of criminal
conviction.4  The Immigration and Naturalization Service
commenced an action against Jama to remove him from the United
States because he had committed a "crime of moral turpitude. '42 At
the initial hearing before the administrative judge, Jama recognized
that he was subject to deportation, but sought various means of relief
38. Jama, 543 U.S. at 336.
39. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543
U.S. 335, No. 03-674 (U.S. May 18, 2004). Petitioner Jama points out that
Somalia has been without a functioning central government since 1991, when the
dictator Said Barr was ousted from power. Id. at 4. Since that time, warring
factions have controlled different pieces of the country, although a situation of
ultimate chaos persists. Id. The United States has no diplomatic relations with
Somalia, including no embassy or consular relations with any central government
of that country. Id.
40. Id. at 8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2005) (stating that the requirement for
refugee status is "well-founded fear of persecution on account of ... membership
in a particular social group"). Section 1157 is a renewable statute dealing with the
annual admission of refugees and admission of refugees in emergency situations. It
was originally effective in 1996, and has been renewed since that time.
41. Jama, 543 U.S. at 336; see also Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39, at 8-9
(noting that Jama was first eligible for removal when he was convicted for third-
degree assault in 1999. Petitioner was sentenced to one year imprisonment, but the
court stayed the sentence and gave him probation. The day after he was released,
he was found intoxicated in violation of his probation and was ordered to perform
the sentenced originally ordered. After he completed the year-long sentence, he
was transferred to the custody of the INS in order to await further removal
proceedings).
42. Jama, 543 U.S. at 336; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (setting
forth the definition and history of "crime of moral turpitude").
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from that judgment.43 Jama neglected to elect a country where he
would prefer to be deported.' In response to the petitioner's lack of
preference, the Immigration Judge order that Jama be removed to
Somalia, the country of his birth, as well as his citizenship. 45 The
decision to deport petitioner Jama to Somalia was upheld by the
Board of Immigration Appeals, and Jama sought no review of this
decision in the Federal Court of Appeals.4 6
Instead, Jama instituted collateral proceedings under the habeas
statute.47 He filed his petition challenging the designation of Somalia
as his destination with the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota.48 The petition alleged that, because Somalia lacked a
functioning central government, it was therefore unable to grant
consent in advance to his removal, and that the United States
government was barred from ordering his removal to Somalia
without such advance approval. 49 The District Court agreed with
Jama on the grounds that he could not be removed to a country that
had not consented in advance to receive him, and granted him habeas
relief.5° The Federal government appealed this ruling, and a divided
43. Id. at 337. Jama attempted to avoid removal by requesting adjustments of
status, withholding of removal, relief under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, and asylum. Id. See also Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39, at 9-10. In his
brief, Jama noted that, upon consideration of these alternative options presented by
petitioner, the Immigration Judge found that the criminal conviction made Jama
ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. The Immigration Judge also ruled
that due to the petitioner's criminal record, the Judge was required to decline
adjustment of residential status. Id. Finally, because the petitioner neglected to
include information that he would be tortured upon removal to Somalia, his
application under the Convention Against Torture was also declined. Id.





49. Id. See also Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39, at 11 (describing how
petitioner did not question the validity of his removal order, or even his eventual
removal to Somalia, but based his argument on the premise that under 8 U.S.C
§ 1231 (b)(2) the INS could not remove him to Somalia without first establishing
that there was an existent central government that would accept him).
50. Jama, 543 U.S. at 337; see also Jama, 329 F.3d at 634; Brief of
Petitioner, supra note 39, at 11-12 (describing the ruling of the District Court,
where Judge Tunheim found that the habeas petition raised a "pure question of
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding
that 8 U.S.C.S. § 1231(b)(2) does not require actual acceptance by
the government of the destination country.5 Jama then filed for
review by the Supreme Court, and a writ of certiorari was granted.52
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion for the Court. 3 His
analysis begins by clarifying that, once an alien has been declared
ineligible to remain in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)
governs the process of determining to which country he should be
removed.54 The statute gives the alien an opportunity to designate a
law" and concerned only whether INS's removal of Jama violated the authorizing
statute). Additionally, Jama's brief argued that the court "adopted a unified
construction of the statutory provision, giving effect to all of its clauses, and held
that the acceptance requirement applied to all of the sub-clauses listed in step three
of the removal statute." Id. at 12.
51. Jama, 543 U.S. at page 337 (citing Jama, 329 F.3d at 633-635). See also
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39, at 13. In the brief, Jama explained that, in
arriving at this decision, the Eighth Circuit decided to disregard a line of decisions
by other Courts of Appeals that held that an acceptance requirement should be read
into § 1231(b)(2), and did so by claiming that they were neither bound nor
persuaded by such previous rulings. The majority, in breaking with the traditional
interpretation of the provision, understood that it would lead to the result where a
country could refuse to accept an alien, and the Attorney General could turn around
and force a removal to the same country regardless of acceptance. This possibility
was rationalized by stating that it is not together uncommon to accomplish a task
by following a polite rebuff with a forceful action. Id. The dissenting opinion
below, written by Judge Bye, would have followed the "well-settled" application
set forth by Judge Learned Hand in Tom Man, and stated vehemently that there
were no circumstances that allowed removal without acceptance by the destination
country's government. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39, at 14.
52. Jama, 543 U.S. at 338.
53. Id. at 338-353. Justice Scalia was joined in his opinion by Justices
Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas.
54. Id. at 337 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(2) (2005)), which states in relevant
part:
(b) Countries to which aliens may be removed:
2. Other aliens. Subject to paragraph (3) -
(A) Selection of country by alien. Except as
otherwise provided in this paragraph -
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country of choice, and authorizes the Attorney General to select the
country of removal if the alien makes no such designation." Justice
Scalia explains that the issue in the case at hand is whether this
provision in § 1231(b)(2) "prohibits removing an alien to a country
without the explicit, advance consent of that country's
government. 56
Justice Scalia then explains the underlying facts for the Jama case
(i) any alien not described in paragraph (1) who has
been ordered removed may designate one country to which the
alien wants to be removed, and
(ii) the Attorney General shall remove the alien to
the country the alien so designates.
(B) Limitation on designation. An alien may designate
under subparagraph (A)(i) a foreign territory contiguous to the
United States, an adjacent island, or an island adjacent to a
foreign territory contiguous to the United States as the place to
which the alien is to be removed only if the alien is a native,
citizen, subject or national of, or has resided that designated
territory or island.
(C) Disregarding designation. The Attorney General
may disregard a designation under subparagraph (A)(i) if--
(i) the alien fails to designate a country promptly;
(ii) the government of the country does not inform
the Attorney General finally, within 30 days after the date the
Attorney General first inquires, whether the government will
accept the alien into the country;
(iii) the government of the country is not willing to
accept the alien into the country; or
(iv) the Attorney General decides that removing the
alien to the country is prejudicial to the United States.
(D) Alternative country. If an alien is not removed to a
country designated under subparagraph (A)(i), the Attorney
General shall remove the alien to a country of which the alien is
subject, national or citizen unless the government of a country --
(i) does not inform the Attorney General or the alien
family, within 30 days after the date the Attorney General first
inquires or within another period of time the Attorney General
decides is reasonable, whether the government will accept the
alien into the country; or
(ii) is not willing to accept the alien into the country.
(E) Additional Removal countries.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
55. § 1231(b)(2).
56. Jama, 543 U.S. at 338.
and the procedural history of how the case arrived before the Court.57
He then sets forth the specific language of § 1231 (b)(2), which, as he
identifies, details the procedure used by the Attorney General in
selecting the country of destination once the alien is deemed
removable.58 At the onset of the opinion, Justice Scalia sets out the
four consecutive removal commands found within the statute.59 The
first command states that "[a]n alien shall be removed to the country
of his choice (subparagraphs (A) to (C)) unless one of the conditions
eliminating that command is satisfied., 60  The second removal
command states "otherwise he shall be removed to the country of
which he is a citizen (subparagraph (D)) unless one of the conditions
eliminating that command is satisfied.",6 ' The third command says
"otherwise he shall be removed to one of the countries with which he
has a lesser connection (clauses (i) to (vi) of subparagraph (E)). 62
Finally, the fourth removal command states that "if that is
'impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible,' he shall be removed to
'another country whose government will accept the alien into that
country (clause (vii) of subparagraph (E))."63 Justice Scalia explains
that the first two removal commands were not applicable in this case
for two reasons. First, the petitioner neglected to designate a country
of choice. Second, Somalia, the petitioner's country of citizenship,
did not inform the Attorney General of its willingness to accept him,
57. Id. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
58. Id. at 338-342. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia
also makes an important procedural point, stating that in March 2003, the
Department of Homeland Security and its Bureau of Border Security assumed the
authority and responsibility for instituting the removal program. Jama, 543 U.S. at
338 n.1. (citing Homeland Security Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 2192-2194 (codified at 6
U.S.C. §§ 251(2), 252(a) (2000 & Supp. 11)). Due to this reallocation of authority,
the discretion formerly vested in the Attorney General is now designated to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. H.S.A. §551(d)(2). However, because
petitioner's removal proceedings occurred before this reallocation of authority, the
opinion continues to refer to the Attorney General as the ultimate decision maker.
Jama, 543 U.S. at 338 n.1.
59. Id. at 341 (citing § 123 1(b)(2)).
60. Id. (citing § 123 1(b)(2)).
61. Id. (citing § 1231(b)(2)).
62. Id. (citing § 1231 (b)(2)).
63. Id. (quoting §1231(b)(2)).
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therefore removing any obligation to send petitioner there. 64
Therefore, the removal in question fell under the third command, and
Justice Scalia presents the question as "whether the Attorney General
was precluded from removing petitioner to Somalia under the third
step.., because Somalia had not given its consent., 65
Justice Scalia next analyzes the statutory interpretation used by
the Court to determine that this statute does not include an
acceptance requirement in step three. 66 Justice Scalia explains that
the majority refuses to assume that Congress omitted requirements
from the statute that it intended to be applied, and that the Court's
"reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in
the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement
manifest." 67 Justice Scalia notes that, throughout subparagraph (E),
an explicit requirement of acceptance only appears in clause (vii),
which is the final clause. This may only be exercised by the Attorney
General after he determines that all other removal options are
"impracticable, inadvisable or impossible., 68  However, Justice
Scalia reviews clauses (i) through (vi) first, making it clear that, both
in the statutory language itself and the process of selecting a country
for removal, there is no mention of an acceptance requirement within
those clauses. 69  He points to the consequences produced by the
acceptance requirements through the rest of paragraph 2, which he
opines make the lack of such a requirement in subparagraph (E)
appear intentional.7" He concludes his analysis of this point by
64. Jama, 543 U.S. at 341. The petitioner's lack of designation rendered
sections (A)-(C) inapplicable, and the lack of response from Somalia rendered
section (D)(i) inapplicable as well. Id.
65. Id. The particular section of the statute applied by Justice Scalia is clause
(iv) of subparagraph (E). Id.
66. Id. See supra note 33-37 and accompanying text (noting many of the basic
tenets of statutory interpretation utilized by the Court).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 342 (citing § 123 1(b)(2)).
69. Id. (citing § 1231(b)(2)) (noting that the preliminary six clauses simply
give the Attorney General authority to remove the alien to any one of the countries
mentioned within).
70. Id. Justice Scalia further extrapolated by stating that subparagraph (C)
tells the effect of non-acceptance in the first step; subparagraph (D) does the same
for step two; and clause (vii) of subparagraph (E) has the same affect on step four.
Id. at 342. Writing for the dissent, Justice Souter disagreed, claiming that there are
explaining that the presence of acceptance by the destination country
may be a factor in determining whether the removal is impossible or
impracticable, but that such acceptance alone is not a dispositive
factor.7'
Justice Scalia then analyzes the petitioner's argument that uses
the word "another" in clause (vii) as a means of reading an
acceptance requirement into the former six clauses ((i)-(vi)).72 The
petitioner argued that, if the final option is "another country whose
government will accept the alien," then the implication is that the
countries discussed in the former six clauses were also countries
"whose governments will accept the alien."73 This argument, Justice
Scalia notes, calls for an interpretation that is far too broad, and very
similar to one recently rejected by the Court. 74 The Court rejects this
argument on the grounds that it ran contrary to the "grammatical
'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting clause or
phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or
phrase . . .that it immediately follows." 75 Justice Scalia concludes
that the word "another" serves only to exclude the countries that had
been previously considered under step three and referred to in the
"conditional prologue of clause (vii). ' 76
only three steps altogether, and that clause (vii) of subparagraph (E) simply part of
step three, as opposed to its own step. Id. at 341 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
majority rejected this proposal by stating that clause (vii) applies only after all
other options within subparagraph (E) are exhausted, therefore constituting a
distinct step in the selection process. Id.
71. Id. at 342 (majority opinion).
72. Id. (citing § 123 1(b)(2)).
73. Id. at 343 (citing § 123 1(b)(2)).
74. Id. (citing Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (declining to read
the limiting clause "which exists in the national economy" into the term "previous
work"). See also FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389-390 (1959).
75. Id. (citing Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26-28). In Barnhart, the Court refused to
treat "any other" as the "apparently connecting modifier" that the dissent here
believes "another" to be. Jama, 543 U.S. at 343 n.3.
76. Id. at 344 (citing § 1231(b)(2)). In addition to the interpretation of the
word "another," the dissent put great importance on the textual differences between
the 1996 legislation and the current version. Id. at 343 n.3. The dissent
particularly emphasized how the statute read "any country" in 1996, but was
amended to read "another country." Id. at 358 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia dismissed this argument, claiming that there are numerous stylistic changes
between the two versions, but none indicate any substantive changes. Id. at 343 n.3
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In furtherance of the "last antecedent rule," Justice Scalia notes
that the structure of subparagraph (E) also suggests that no
acceptance requirement should be read into the first six clauses. 77 He
explains that each clause ends with a period, which infers that they
are distinct. Therefore, he notes, it is unnecessary to read any further
than each separate clause to understand its complete meaning. 78
Justice Scalia further states that, by reading an acceptance
requirement into each of the first six clauses in subparagraph (E), it
would nullify the Attorney General's executive judgment in weighing
practical and geopolitical concerns when selecting a destination
country because any removal without acceptance would be per se
"impractical, inadvisable, or impossible."79  Justice Scalia contend
that the absence of advance consent would not necessarily render a
removal impossible or impractical because there have been various
occasions when a government has accepted a removed alien when he
arrives at their border.80
Justice Scalia then turns to petitioner's argument that, even if no
acceptance requirement is explicit in the text, there is one "manifest
in the entire structure of § 1231 (b)(2)."81 The petitioner contended, if
this were not the case, the Attorney General would be able to
circumvent the acceptance requirements written into subparagraph
(A) or (D) by removing the alien under subparagraph (E).82 The
majority declared that this argument is too broad.83 Justice Scalia
explains that such circumvention can only occur when the "country
(majority opinion). He further opined that the dissent must explain why there are
so many changes that are purely stylistic, yet the Court should give this change
monumental impact on the actual meaning of the statute. Id.
77. Id. at 344.
78. Id. Justice Scalia, in footnote four, rebutted the cases set forth by the
dissent on this point by showing that the "modifying clause appeared not in a
structurally discrete statutory provision, but at the end of a single, integrated list."
Id. at 344 n.4 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)).
79. Id. at 344.
80. Id. at 345. Justice Scalia stated that removal in this case would be as
simple as putting the petitioner on a regularly scheduled flight to Dubai or Nairobi,
and that such a process has been successfully undertaken various times. Id. (citing
App. 36-40) (declaration of detention officer Eric O'Denius)).
81. Id. at 345 (citing § 123 1(b)(2)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 346.
of birth under clause (iv) is also the country of citizenship that was
disqualified at step two for failure to accept the alien."84 While such
a scenario is possible, it will not always be true, and the petitioner
seeks "to impose an acceptance requirement on all removals under
step three." 85 Justice Scalia refutes this argument by claiming that
the premise of an overarching acceptance requirement to be read into
all of §1231(b)(2) is simply not accurate. 86  He explains that,
although subparagraph (A) has an acceptance requirement,
subparagraph (C) states that the Attorney General "'may' disregard"
the designation set forth in (A) if the destination country's acceptance
is not timely.87  According to Justice Scalia, the word "may"
connotes discretion, and is used in direct contrast with the word
"shall," which illustrates that the petitioner's consistent reading of
acceptance throughout the entire statute is inaccurate.88
Justice Scalia then sets forth an argument supporting the
majority's interpretation of the statute that stems from procedural
efficiency and ensures that the removal process serves its purpose. 89
He states that the fact that acceptance requirement exists in the fourth
step does not create any inference that the same requirement exists in
84. Id.
85. Id. at 344. Justice Scalia explained that this is also an argument set forth
by the dissenting justices, who would like to set a blanket requirement of
acceptance on all removals. Id. In this case, Justice Scalia states that several
clauses under subparagraph (E) would describe Kenya, not Somalia, therefore
showing how overly broad an acceptance requirement on all removals would be.
Id.
86. Id. at 346.
87. Id. (citing § 123 1(b)(2)).
88. Id. at 346 (citing § 123 l(b)(2)). Justice Scalia also found that the reading
of "may" as "shall" would be inappropriate in many circumstances. He further
contends "[w]ould Congress really have wanted to preclude the Attorney General
from removing an alien to his country of choice, merely because that country took
31 days rather than 30 to manifest its acceptance?" Id. Justice Scalia also
questions whether the same incompatibility between discretion and direction would
be present in subparagraph (D), given that the language says "shall remove an
alien," "unless" there is no timely acceptance. Id. at 347 n.7 (citing § 1231 (b)(2)).
Justice Scalia promptly dismisses this as a decision that does not need to made
now; however, it is enough to show that an acceptance requirement does not
pervade the entire selection process. Id.
89. Id. at 347.
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the third.90 Justice Scalia explains that it would be incorrect to
believe that, because Congress requires the Attorney General to
obtain advance consent from those countries to which the alien has
very little connection, Congress must also require the same advance
consent from those countries to which the alien does have a
connection.9' In order to allow the removal process to function
properly, Justice Scalia describes, there must be an opportunity for a
country to be selected under step three; otherwise he notes, the only
opportunity is through step four, which clearly requires the
destination country's acceptance. 92 However, if no country is willing
to accept the alien, he is left in the same "removable-but-
unremovable limbo." After Zadvydas v. Davis, the alien must be
allowed back into society within six months. 93 Because the alien has
greater opportunity to remain in society, there is even less reason to
read limitations in to the country-selection process. In particular, it is
unnecessary to read limitations that Congress did not explicitly
include, such as the third step of the process, which usually provides
the Attorney General with the best option for removal.94
Furthermore, Justice Scalia opines, if an acceptance requirement
is read into each provision and clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(2), even
though one has not been expressly included by Congress, it would
undermine the time-tested policy of deferring to the President on
matters of foreign affairs.95 Through explicit authority granted by
Congress in the statute, the Attorney General has the ability to avoid
removals that would have negative diplomatic repercussions or




93. Id. at 347-48 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678).
94. Id. at 348. Justice Scalia is clearly concerned with the efficiency and
effectiveness of the removal process, and more specifically the country-selection s
process. If, as a result of reading further restrictions in the already established
process, there is a greater chance for removal failing and more aliens being re-
released into American society, Justice Scalia believes that we should strictly
interpret the statute as written to enable a better success rate for alien removals. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Justice Scalia explains that removal decisions, including, but not
limited to, selection of destination countries, "'may implicate our relations with
estimation, is given the authority at each step of the selection process
to pass over countries that may not accept the alien, or that refuse to
assure that their border security forces will allow the alien to enter. 97
In addition to preserving Executive powers, it is not necessary to
infer an acceptance requirement to ensure that the Attorney General
will properly consider the conditions within the country selected for
removal.98 Justice Scalia continues by listing the remedies or
alternatives available to removable aliens fearful for their lives,
including asylum, withholding of removal, relief under international
agreements prohibiting torture, and temporary protected status.9 9
Compared with the petitioner's argument that silence from Somalia's
government automatically translates into future mistreatment and
justifies not removing anyone to that country with these alternative
remedies, use of these alternative remedies "strikes a better balance"
in removing inadmissible aliens and securing their safety.'
The Court then analyzes the petitioner's final argument that there
exists a "settled construction" of §1231(b)(2), as well as petitioner's
belief that, due to its most recent re-enactment by Congress, the
"settled construction" should be interpreted as law.' 0 1 However,
Justice Scalia quickly disagrees with this argument. After presenting
the two requirements necessary for Congressional ratification, Scalia
foreign powers' and require consideration of 'changing political and economic
circumstances."' Id. at 348 n.7 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
97. Id.
98. Id. This consideration by Justice Scalia is particularly interesting because
it is one of the main concerns of the petitioner, who fears that removal to his native
land of Somalia will be detrimental to his well-being. Justice Scalia notes that this
something that the Attorney General has the authority to consider, but that it does
not appear to hold much weight in the case at bar. Somalia is a country that has
been suffering through Civil War; though it has had no central government for
almost fifteen years, the Attorney General deems it proper to remove petitioner
there.
99. Id. Justice Scalia mentions each of the remedies as alternatives to being
sent to a place where the aliens are fearful for their lives. It is interesting that
petitioner attempted to take advantage of such remedies and was denied. Hence,
the petitioner is still being sent to the country that he is scared to return to, and, in
his case, none of the proposed remedies to such a situation were of any use to him.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 349.
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notes that neither was met in this situation."'10 2 He begins by
explaining how the current removal procedure, located within
§1231(b)(2), is actually a new creation formed by a combination of
previous distinct procedures.'0 3 Justice Scalia continues to refute the
petitioner's argument by stating that the cases he relies on address
only the McCarran-Walter Act's deportation provision (the 1952
version of § 1253), but not the exclusionary provision.104 Thus, as
102. Id. The first of the two requirements is that "Congress ...simply re-
enact[ed] §1231(b)(2) without change." Id. The second is that the "judicial
consensus [was] so broad and unquestioned that we must presume Congress knew
of and endorsed it. Id.
103. Id. Justice Scalia points out that the current removal procedure was
created in 1996 by a merger of the previously utilized "deportation" and
"exclusion" procedures. Id. (citing IIRIRA, §304(a)(3), § 1229(a)). Historically,
the immigration laws and policies implemented by the United States' government
have distinguished between those aliens already residing in the United States and
those who are attempting to enter this country. Id. (citing Leng May Ma v. Barber,
357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)). The differentiation between the earlier procedures was
set forth in Title H of the Immigration and Nationality Act, where a deportation
proceeding was necessary to expel an alien already residing within the United
States, and an exclusion proceeding was necessary to expel an alien seeking
admission to the United States. Id. See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-
27 (1982) (explaining differences between deportation and exclusion proceedings).
The petitioner, who was admitted into the United States to reside as a refugee, was
subject to exclusion hearings when his refugee status was in question, as opposed
to deportation proceedings. Jama, 543 U.S. at 349 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 207.8
(1995)). The petitioner was subject to exclusion proceedings instead of deportation
hearings because his application for admission was ruled to have been made after
his criminal conviction for third-degree assault; he had not applied for admission
before that point. Id. at 349 n. 8. According to 8 U.S.C. §1 159(a)(1), a refugee
must undergo "inspection and examination for admission to the United States as an
immigrant" in accordance with the former exclusion provision one year after
entering the country. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.S. § 1159(a)(1)). The district director
performing this examination found that he was not admissible due to his criminal
conviction, therefore subjecting him to expulsion and exclusion proceedings under
pre-1996 law. Id.
104. Jama, 543 U.S. at 350 (citing Tom Man, 264 F.2d at 926; Rogers v. Lu,
262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). In both cases cited by the petitioner, the applicable
Courts of Appeals barred deportation to China, with whom the United States lacked
any diplomatic relations, without prior consent from China's government. Id.
(citing Tom Man, 264 F.2d at 928 (reading the acceptance requirement necessary
for clause (vii) into the previous six clauses); Rogers, 262 F.2d at 471)). The
dissent claims that the Board of Immigration Appeals followed the cited cases and
adhered to the same decision. Id. at 351 n. 10 (Souter, J., dissenting). Most of the
Justice Scalia points out, of the two former provisions that make up
the current removal process, only one has an element of "'settled
construction,"' while the other has no such reading.'
0 5
Justice Scalia further dissects the petitioner's argument of "settled
construction" by showing that there was no clear judicial consensus
with respect to that provision.'0 6  He explains that the so-called
"judicial consensus" consists of two Court of Appeals decisions, one
of which was only a "two-sentence per curiam that considered step
two, not step three."'0 7 Justice Scalia states that, with regards to the
new 1231(b)(2), the acceptance requirement "is 'neither a settled
judicial construction nor one which we would be justified in
time, the Board of Immigration Appeals follows the law within the circuit where
the case surfaces. Id. Therefore, after the decision of Tom Man, the Board of
Immigration Appeals adhered to the Second District's decision. Id. However, in
the case of In re Niesel, the Board of Immigration Appeals decided not to follow
the circuit court's decision and refused to read an acceptance requirement into step
three. Id. (citing In re Niesel, 10 I. & N. Dec. 57, 59 (1962)). Justice Scalia
explains that, at the same time the previous cases were handed down, other courts
were refusing to employ an acceptance requirement with the exclusionary
provision, which was found in the former 8 U.S.C. § 1227. Jama, 543 U.S. at 350
(majority opinion) (citing § 1227). See, e.g., Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644 (2d
Cir. 1969). Finally, Justice Scalia explains that when Congress amended the
exclusion provision, adding three new categories of destination countries as well as
a last-resort possibility, courts were very dubious as to whether or not to read the
acceptance requirement into the preceding clauses. Id. See Walai v. INS, 552 F.
Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
105. Jama, 543 U.S. at 352. Justice Scalia, in one of his footnotes,
disassembles the dissent's argument that §1231(b)(2) descends solely from the
previous deportation provision (and not the exclusion provision). Id. at 352 n. 11.
He claims that the former exclusion provision had a descendant in § 1231 (b)(1), but
that this provision applied only to aliens being removed immediately as they
arrived at the border, and not to formerly excludable aliens who were granted
access and admission into the country. Id. (citing §§ 123 1(b)(1)(A), (c)(1)). Under
the current system, all aliens are removed and their destination countries selected
under §1231(b)(2), as opposed to the former system where some were excluded
and some deported. Id. Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, it is clear that
§1231(b)(2) is a descendant of not only the exclusion provision, but also the
deportation provision. Id. (citing § 1231 (b)(2)). Justice Scalia concludes by stating
that the enactment of § 1231 (b)(2), contrary to what the dissenting opinion states,
did in fact create a large change, whereas now refugees cannot be expelled without
acceptance. Id. at 352 n. 11.
106. Id. at 352.
107. Id. (citing Rogers, 262 F.2d at 471).
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presuming Congress, by its silence, impliedly approved." 10 8  He
concludes the analysis of this argument by stating that the petitioner's
proof is too weak "to justify presuming that Congress endorsed it
when the text and structure of the statute are to the contrary."'10 9
Justice Scalia concludes the majority opinion by discussing the
final position taken by the petitioner in his brief on the merits, which
deals with the idea that Somalia is not a "country" under the statute
because of its lack of functioning central government. 10 Justice
Scalia simply dismisses this potential argument, based on the premise
that the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on that point, and
therefore the Court will not render an opinion on it.1"1
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion, and was joined by
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 112 Justice Souter begins the
dissent by laying out the contents of 8 U.S.C. §1231(b) and each of
the steps that are taken while selecting a destination country for a
removable alien.1 13 He states that, under the dissent's interpretation,
the acceptance requirement applies to all seven clauses of paragraph
108. Id. (quoting United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55 n.13 (1964)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 352 n.13; see Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39, at 15. This
petitioner did not present this issue to the Court of Appeals.
111. Jama, 543 U.S. at 352 n.13.
112. Id. at 354 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. Id. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. However, there is one
major difference that Justice Souter raises in his analysis of the steps within
§1231(b)(2), dealing primarily with the quantity of steps. Id. at 353 n.2. Justice
Souter claims that there are actually only three steps, and that clause (vii) of
paragraph (E) does not constitute a separate, fourth step. Id. He justifies this
argument by stating that it would be "odd to view them as entirely distinct" as they
are located within the same paragraph, but also because the limits placed on the
seventh clause ("impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible") pertain directly to
those countries discussed in the previous six clauses. Id. at 353 n.2. Justice Souter
believes that the majority counted four steps in order to better utilize the argument
that "three of the four steps, but not step three, expressly address 'the consequence
of nonacceptance."' Id. Additionally, he believes that separating into four steps
makes it easier to discredit the petitioner's argument that the acceptance
requirement for clauses (i-vi) are rooted in clause (vii). Id. See also Jama, 329
F.3d at 633.
(E), and that the majority's interpretation contradicts the text,
structure and legislative history of the statute.' 4
Justice Souter first questions the majority's assertion that
Congress left out an acceptance requirement from the text of the
statute, and raises the issue of whether the acceptance requirement in
the seventh clause should be read into the previous six.11 5  The
petitioner interprets the language of "another" willing country from
clause (vii) as applying the acceptance requirement to the previous
six. 11 6  Justice Souter accepts this reasoning by explaining that
Congress had other drafting alternatives at their disposal when
formulating clause (vii); if it had not wanted an overarching
acceptance requirement to extend to clauses (i-vi), it could have used
language that did not relate to the countries proposed in the preceding
clauses.11 7 Justice Souter advocates for a reading of the statutory text
that follows the decision in United States v. Standard Brewery, which
set forth the standard that all Congressional language must be given
due force and effect." 8 Following this reasoning, if the statute was
meant to be understood without the acceptance requirement
extending to all seven clauses, it should not have been included in
clause (vii) or Congress should have separated that clause
altogether. "1 9
Justice Souter opines that the majority attempted to avoid a
114. Id. at 353.
115. Id. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for the specific text of
paragraph (E) and the seven clauses located therein.
116. Id. at 353-54.
117. Id. at 354. Justice Souter proposes that Congress could have utilized
alternative language to draft clause (vii), such as "'a country whose government
will accept the alien, or 'any country whose government will accept the alien,' or
'another country, if that country will accept the alien."' Id. Any of the preceding
suggestions would have supported the majority's interpretation that clause (vii) had
no relation to the earlier clauses of paragraph (E). However, because the clause is
not drafted in such a manner, the language of the seventh clause further supports
Justice Souter's reading of an overarching acceptance requirement throughout all
seven clauses. Id.
118. Id. at 355 (citing United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210,
218 (1920)) (all words used in a legislative act are to be given force and meaning,
and therefore qualifying words cannot be rejected or ignored).
119. Id. (citing Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. at 218) ("[i]f so the use of this
phraseology was quite superfluous, and it would have been enough to have written
the act without the qualifying words").
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discussion of congressional language by leaning on the "last
antecedent rule" as a grammatical reason why the acceptance
requirement should be read in the final clause of paragraph (E),
where it is expressly set out. 120 However, as Justice Souter explains,
the "last antecedent rule" is not formulaically applied, but can "be
overcome by other indicia of meaning. '121 The first indicia,
according to Justice Souter, is the difference in language between
clause (vii), which gives a final option for deportation, and the
wording of the corresponding provision dealing with exclusion,
found in the "adjacent and cognate paragraph of the same
subsection."' 122  Both paragraphs, the first dealing with exclusions
and the second dealing with deportations, include last-resort
provisions to determine a destination country when all of the
preceding provisions fail. 123 However, as Justice Souter points out,
there is a major difference in the two final-resort provisions: the one
governing deportations states "another country whose government
will accept the alien into that country," while the provision governing
over exclusions states "[a] country with a government that will accept
the alien into the country's territory."'124 According to Justice Souter,
this difference is significant because Congress uses two different
words in parallel provisions of similar paragraphs, and would not
have done so had they not meant different things by their different
120. Id. See supra notes 74-5 and accompanying text. In Barnhart, the test
was defined as "a limiting clause or phrase . .. should ordinarily be read as
modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.... ." Barnhart, 540
U.S. at 26. If such a rule applied here, according to Justice Souter, it would mean
that the acceptance requirement of "whose government will accept," would modify
only the final option "country" set forth in clause (vii), and not any of the countries
proposed in the first six clauses. Jama, 543 U.S. at 355.
121. Id. (citing Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26). Justice Souter continues to explain
that such indicia have instructed the court not to apply the last antecedent rule as
many times as it has counseled the court to apply it. Id.
122. Id. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. As explained by
Justice Scalia in the majority opinion, the 1996 version of the Immigration and
Nationality Act consolidated the prior statutes dealing with alien exclusions and the
other dealing with alien deportation. Id. at 348 (majority opinion). Within the
current statute, exclusion is discussed in paragraph (1), and deportation is discussed
in paragraph (2), which is currently at issue in this case. Id.
123. Id. at 355 (Souter, J., dissenting). See § 123 l(b)(1), (2).
124. Jama, 543 U.S. at 356 (quoting §§ 123 l(b)(2)(E)(vii), 123 l(b)(1)(C)(iv)).
usage.' 25 Justice Souter attacks the majority's interpretation that
these provisions should be read in exactly the same way by stating
that the Court "runs afoul of the usual rule that when the legislature
uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language
in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended."' 26
He claims that the petitioner's interpretation, which the dissenting
opinion adopts, is consistent with the theory that Congress distinctly
chooses specific words for a reason.127
Continuing with the general theory that Congress elects distinct
words with distinct meanings, the dissenting opinion notes that it is
clear that the explicit use of the word "another" was not a superfluous
election.' 28  Justice Souter explains that the 1952 version of the
Immigration and Nationality Act described the country of last option
with a neutral modifier, but that Congress amended it 1996 to
125. Id. See §§ 1231(b)(1)(C)(iv), 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii). Justice Souter points
out that in the paragraph governing deportation, "'another country' with a willing
government" is typically read to imply that the country named therein is similar to
other countries named in earlier provisions. Jama, 543 at 356-57. Likewise, in the
paragraph governing exclusion, "a country with a willing government" does not
carry the same implication. Id.
126. Id. at 357 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Michain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004));
see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("Where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion").
127. Jama, 543 U.S. at 357. As Justice Souter notes, the majority opinion
claims that the textual difference serves only the purpose of ruling out the countries
that were proposed in the preceding clauses of the third step. Id. at 357 n.3.
However, he explains, such a reading of the word "another" is unnecessary because
the previously proposed countries are ruled out expressly by the language of clause
(vii), which clearly states "[i]f impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible to remove
the alien to each country described in a previous clause of this subparagraph." Id.
Therefore, regardless of whether Congress used the words "a country" as opposed
to the actual text of "another country," such words would not be necessary to make
the exclusion of previously proposed countries clear, as the express language of the
"impracticable" phrase performs that function. Id.
128. Id. at 358. Justice Souter opines that, by implementing this general theory
of statutory interpretation that the Court usually employs, the use of "another" in
clause (vii) was "unmistakably deliberate." Id.
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explicitly change "any" to "another."' 29  The effort Congress
undertook by changing the modifying language of the last-resort
option cannot be simply written off as a superfluous change or one
that was made only for aesthetic purposes.1 30 Justice Souter criticizes
the Court for dismissing this textual modification as nothing more
than a fanciful amendment.' 3' The intended meaning of the changes
made by Congress, according to Justice Souter, can be deduced and
ascertained by looking at its legislative history. 32 This change, he
opines, was made by Congress simply to bring the explicit language
of the text closer to the meaning they intended when drafting the
statute, thereby including language that would imply an acceptance
requirement into all deportation options of paragraph (E). 133 This
argument is further bolstered by case law prior to the 1996
amendment, interpreting the predecessor to the current
§1231(b)(2)(E)(i)-(vi); most of these cases read an acceptance
requirement into the language of the sections corresponding to the
current sections (i)-(vi).'3 4 As Justice Souter explains, this line of
129. Id. (citing McCarren-Walter Act, §243(a)(7)). The 1952 McCarren-
Walter Act codified the last-option deportation as "to any country which is willing
to accept such alien into its territory." Id. (quoting McCarren-Walter Act).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Justice Souter points out that there were various 1996 amendments
that changed "any country" to "another country," and that such textual changes
were not intended to create any true substantive change in the law. Id. at 358-59.
Justice Souter is implying that Congress was already under the impression that the
deportation section of the Immigration and Nationality Act already included an
acceptance requirement throughout all seven clauses, therefore they were simply
changing the text to better express their understanding of the law. Id. at 359 n.4;
see also H.R.REP. No. 104-469, at 234, pt. 1 (1995) (describing the relevant section
as merely "restat[ing]" the earlier provision).
133. Jama, 543 U.S. at 359 n.4. Justice Souter explains this concept further in
a footnote which reads that Congress simply changed the text to bring it closer to
its understood meaning and authority. Id. There was, in the words of Justice
Souter, "no suggestion that the change created 'a momentous limitation upon
executive authority."' Id.
134. Id. at 359; see also Tom Man, 264 F.2d at 926 (quoting Judge Learned
Hand as opining that pre-1996 designations of destination countries are subject to
that country's prior acceptance to receiving alien). Justice Souter also cites to
several other Circuit courts followed the same position as the Second Circuit.
Jama, 543 U.S. at 359 (citing Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.
1961) (citing Tom Man and describing the predecessor to § 123 1(b)(2) as providing
precedent was followed not only by the courts, but also by
administrative agencies such as the Board of Immigration Appeals,
and the Government in internal documents expressly interpreting the
above-stated clauses.' 35  He continues to further discredit the
majority's argument by pointing out that neither the Court nor the
Government cited one judicial decision other than the Eighth
Circuit's decision of the current case that held or implied that an
acceptance requirement should not apply to each clause in the third
step. 136 It is fair to conclude, as Justice Souter opines, that when
Congress amended the language in 1996, it chose language that
that "an alien cannot be deported to any country unless its government is willing to
accept him into its territory").
135. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals also followed this precedent in
the case In re Linnas, where it was decided that "the language of that section
expressly requires, or has been construed to require, that the 'government' of a
country selected under any of the three steps must indicate it is willing to accept a
deported alien into its 'territory."' Id. (quoting In re Linnas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 307,
309 (1985)). Justice Souter disagrees with the majority's opinion that the Board of
Immigration Appeals was simply following the circuit precedence, and contends
that nowhere in the opinion does the Board state that they are following such
precedence, where in other opinions they expressly state such guidance. Id. at 360
n.5. Justice Souter also points out that the Government was also interpreting the
statutory language in line with these decisions. As recently as in 2003, the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel authored an opinion that indirectly stated
that clauses (i) through (vi) required prior acceptance. Id. at 360 (quoting
Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Attorney General: Limitations on the
Detention Authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 27, n. 11 (Feb.
20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/INSDetention.html)).
136. Id. at 360. Justice Souter states how this very point was made by the
District Court judge, who in his decision claimed "in fifty pages of briefing, the
government has not cited a single case in which a federal court has sanctioned the
removal of a legally admitted alien to a country that has not agreed to accept him."
Id. (quoting Jama v. INS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *28). Justice Souter also
emphasizes that Justice Scalia, in writing the Court's opinion, fails to cite a single
case in support for this interpretation. Id. Justice Souter also uses the lack of
supporting judicial decisions to further discredit the majority's argument by stating
that the lack of supporting authority knocks out their sole rebuttal to petitioner's
argument of a "settled construction." Id. at 361 n.6. He vehemently disagrees with
the Court's reliance on United States v. Powell, which stated that there was no
"settled construction" because there were other cases decided to the contrary. Id.
(citing Powell, 379 U.S. at 48). Here, Justice Powell claims, Powell fails because
there was an unanimous interpretation of the deportation procedures, therefore
supporting petitioner's argument of "settled construction." Id.
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would support its understanding that the statute required acceptance
from the destination country's government.'37
Next, Justice Souter responds to the Court's argument that there
is no sense of "settled construction" because the current removal
procedure was formed from two separate procedures, those of
deportation and exclusion, and therefore it would be "unsound to
argue that Congress meant to preserve an acceptance requirement"
after the merger.' 38  This argument is misdirected, according to
Justice Souter, because the language of the statutory provision in
dispute, that of § 1231 (b)(2), is not the result of a merger, but remains
virtually unchanged from its predecessor.1 39 Therefore, the statutory
provision in question is not a merger of separate, distinct provisions,
but is actually unchanged language from the prior law that is
supported by "settled judicial and administrative construction." 140
The majority claims that §1231(b)(2) must descend from the prior
exclusion provision because that is what would have governed the
removal of an alien in the petitioner's situation before the current
version of §1231 (b)(2) was amended. 141 However, as Justice Souter
points out, this argument is superfluous because the issue at hand is
not who is covered by the process of removal, but what that process
requires. ' 42 Justice Souter concludes by stating that the text being
137. Id. at 361.
138. Id. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
139. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explains that the language of
the previous expulsion provisions remains substantively the same, with the
exception of a few minor changes, codified in § 123 1(b)(l), while the language of
the current deportation provision, codified in § 1231 (b)(2), tracks the language of its
predecessor almost identically. Id. Compare §1231(b)(1) with §1227(a). Also
compare § 1231 (b)(2) with § 1253(a).
140. Jama, 543 U.S. at 362. Justice Souter's comment here casts great doubt
on the majority's argument, as it is clear that although the current Immigration and
Nationality Act does bring together the separate exclusion and deportation
provisions of the predecessor Act, the separate provisions remain virtually
untouched in their separate provisions. Therefore, the judicial history and case law
interpreting the previous deportation provision should correspond directly and
accurately to the identical language in the current version, which is simply
organized differently.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 364. The question at hand, Justice Souter claims, is what the
process codified in §1231(b)(2) requires when removing aliens from the United
States. Id. The point raised here by the majority deals with who the process
26-1
considered has always been interpreted as requiring acceptance from
the destination country, and the only textual change in that language
actually bolsters that interpretation by not intending any substantive
change in the law. 4
3
Justice Souter next argues that the Court too quickly disregarded
the possibility that, by not requiring an overarching acceptance
requirement in paragraph (E), it would be easy for the Government to
circumvent the acceptance requirements located in paragraphs (A)
and (D).'" The majority states that a situation allowing
circumvention will rarely arise. 145 However, as Justice Souter points
out, a similar opportunity to circumvent will be available for the
Government to use whenever the country of citizenship is one of the
destination options detailed in the previous six clauses of paragraph
(E).146  The petitioner argues that, by not including an acceptance
pertains to, and therefore is outside the scope of what is being decided in this case.
Justice Souter argues that whether or not "changes to other sections of the Act...
enlarged the class of aliens subject to the process is irrelevant" to what the process
itself requires. Id. at 362.
143. Id. Justice Souter continues by stating "[t]ext, statutory history, and
legislative history support reading the clause (vii) language ... as providing that
"any country mentioned in the six preceding clauses" must also submit prior
acceptance before deportation can be authorized. Id.
144. Id. at 364. See id. at 346-47 (majority opinion)). See supra notes 82-88
and accompanying text. The Government claims that paragraph (D) in fact does
not contain an acceptance requirement, however Justice Souter discredits this
argument by stated that such an argument is simply "untenable." Id. at 362 n.8
(Souter, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 346 (majority opinion). See supra notes 84-5 and accompanying
text. Justice Souter notes that the only time this would occur is if the alien's
country of citizenship is the same as the county of birth that refused to accept him.
Id. at 362 (Souter, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 364. See also id. at 346-47 (majority opinion). Justice Souter gives
the example of an alien who resided in the country of his citizenship for some
amount of time before entering the United States: the United States government
would not need acceptance from that country under step three because of clause (i)
if he came directly from that country, or clause (iii), if he came by way of other
countries. Id. at 363 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter continues in a footnote
by saying that the importance of this point is not that the Government will pick a
country that will allow it to circumvent the earlier acceptance requirements, but
that it "will always, or almost always," have that option available. Id. at 363 n.9.
The Government, as Justice Souter points out, also recognizes that the country of
citizenship will always be covered in one of the first six clauses of paragraph (E).
Id.
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requirement in paragraph (E), the Government would be able to
circumvent the explicit acceptance requirements included in
paragraph (A) or (D). 147  Justice Souter argues that the Court
misconstrued this argument and therefore only replied that "there is
no unconditional acceptance requirement at every stage before step
three."'148  The petitioner's argument, as Justice Souter explains, is
not based on any similarity between paragraphs (A) and (D), but on
the second step included in paragraph (D). 149
According to Justice Souter, the majority incorrectly dismissed
the petitioner's argument by claiming that deciding whether or not
subparagraph (D) has an acceptance requirement was not necessary
at that time.150 However, as Justice Souter opines, it is an extremely
timely and important decision because, if there is an acceptance
requirement in step two, it makes the possibility of Government
circumvention even more problematic.' 5 ' The Court, in Justice
Souter's opinion, simply refutes this contention by stating that "other
factors suffice to refute the dissent's more limited contention."'
5 2
Justice Souter continues his dissenting opinion by analyzing the
Government's argument that subparagraph (D) requires acceptance
only when the Secretary is removing the alien to the country of
citizenship, but does not apply an acceptance requirement when the
147. Id. at 364.
148. Id. See id. at 346-47 (majority opinion). See also supra notes 88-9 and
accompanying text.
149. Id. at 364 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter points out that the
petitioner's circumvention argument did not revolve around paragraphs (A) and
(D), but simply on step two of the removal process, which he contended could be
circumvented by step three. Id. at 364 n. 10; see Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39,
at 27. Justice Souter also explains that the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on this
argument when ruling that step three did require acceptance from the destination
country. Jama, 543 U.S. at 364 n. 10. The Ninth Circuit, in its decision, stated that
if the Government's argument was accepted, then even though a government
denied accepting a particular alien, that alien could be airdropped into that country
under step three. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39, at 28. Justice Souter criticizes
the majority's dismissal of petitioner's argument because of his advancement of
alternative arguments; the Government refused to credit the second argument and
only gave weight to the first. Jama, 543 U.S. at 364 n.10.
150. Id. at 365.
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Jama, 543 U.S. at 347 n. 7 (majority opinion)).
Secretary is granted discretionary authority, 153 Justice Souter finds
this reasoning and interpretation flawed for two reasons. 54 The first
reason derives from the textual differences between steps one and
two. 15 5 The first step includes further discretion for the Secretary if
the destination country refuses to accept the alien, whereas the
second step does not include the discretionary language granted to
the Secretary in the absence of acceptance. 156 Justice Souter opines
that the discretionary language included in step one shows that
Congress was aware of and capable of "preserv[ing] the discretion to
act in disregard of a country's nonacceptance," and therefore should
be interpreted as demonstrating that Congress did not intend to allow
the Government to ignore a destination country's nonacceptance
within step two.
1 57
Justice Souter then explains the second reason to reject the
153. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter describes the Government's
argument as stating that "[w]hen acceptance is not forthcoming... the Secretary
still has discretion to do what is merely no longer obligatory." Id. at 366.
154. Id.
155 .Id.
156. Id. Step one, under subparagraph (C), states that "[t]he Secretary may
disregard [an alien's] designation [of a country] if . . . the government of the
country is not willing to accept the alien .... " Id. (quoting § 1231 (b)(2)(C)). In
contrast, the second step, under subparagraph (D), states that "the [Secretary] shall
remove the alien to a country of [citizenship] unless the government of the country
... is not willing to accept the alien.... ." Id. (quoting § 1231(b)(2)(D)). The first
step gives discretion whether or not the acceptance requirement if fulfilled, whereas
the second step only grants the Secretary authority if the destination country
accepts. Id.
157. Id. Justice Souter points out that the Court relies on similar statutory
interpretation in other parts of their argument, where it contends that because an
express acceptance requirement was included in parts of § 1231 (b)(2), then no such
requirement should be read into § 1231 (b)(2)(E)(i)-(vi), where a requirement is not
express. Id. at 366 n.11. The Court feels that there should be even greater
reluctance to imply an acceptance requirement when Congress has expressly
included one elsewhere in the statute. Id. at 341 (majority opinion) (quoting Brief
of Petitioner, supra note 39). However, as Justice Souter explains, the Court's
reasoning is incorrect because the use of "another" in subparagraph (E)(vii), which
attaches an acceptance requirement throughout the first six clauses of the
subparagraph. Id. at 367 n. 11 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter points out that
it is curious how the Court is willing to grant flexibility in other sections of the
statute when Congress has explicitly shown that knows how to make such express
grants elsewhere in the statute. Id.
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majority's reasoning and interpretation, which derives from the text
of the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952.158 The text of this statute, the
predecessor to the current INS statute, stated that, when there was no
acceptance under step two, the Government had to resort to the
procedures found in step three. 5 9 Under the predecessor statute, the
Attorney General did not have the same level of discretion as he now
claims; this is significant because the legislative history surrounding
the amendment indicate that no substantive change was desired. 60
Therefore, as Justice Souter proclaims, given the lack of
contradictory language within the text of the statute to Congress's
documented intent, the current statute should be interpreted as was
the predecessor version. 161
The final topic that Justice Souter raises in his dissent is a
response to the Court's final argument stating that a ruling in the
petitioner's favor would "abridge the exercise of the Executive
judgment" and therefore remove the President's power over matters
of foreign concern.' 62  Justice Souter rejects this argument by
pointing out that Congress has expressly limited the Executive's
discretion by enacting a limited process that must be followed when
158. Id. at 367.
159. Id. The text of the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952, in its relevant part,
reads:
[i]f the government of the country of citizenship fails finally to
advise the Attorney General or the alien within three months...
whether that government will or will not accept such alien into its
territory, then such deportation shall be directed by the Attorney
General within his discretion and without necessarily giving any
priority or preference because of their order as herein set forth to
one of the countries now listed in subparagraph (E).
Id. (quoting McCarren-Walter Act of 1952, § 243(a)).
160. Id. Justice Souter points out that the two House Reports on the bill that
amended the old Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to the current version
state that no substantive changes were intended. Id. See supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 344, 348 (majority opinion); see supra note 96-101 and
accompanying text. The Court claims that the petitioner's approach would lead to
the lessening of the President's discretion of foreign policy. Id.
removing aliens.' 63  Therefore, a discussion over how much
discretion the Executive has over the removal of aliens does not
advance the task at hand, as the discussion should simply be how
much discretion Congress has chosen to appoint it.164 Justice Souter
concludes by stating his opinion that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed. 165
V. IMPACT
The repercussions and ramifications of the Supreme Court's
decision in Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement166 have
already had great impact on many lives and will continue to affect
many more.' 67 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
the growing concern to halt illegal immigration and remove aliens
who may pose a threat to national security, the ramifications of this
decision may reach farther than expected.168  When the Supreme
Court handed down the decision, the New York Times referred to the
petitioner's situation as "one of the stickiest political and moral
quandaries" confronting the United States government. 69 In light of
163. Id. at 368 (Souter, J., dissenting). Congress has the authority to establish
such a process, as the Constitution grants Congress's authority over matters dealing
with aliens. Id. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
164. Jama, 543 U.S. at 368.
165. Id. at 369.
166. Id.
167. See DECISIONS: Jama v. Immigration and Customs, 125 S. Ct. 694, 27
NAT'L L.J. 16 (2005) (stating that the decision set forth by the Court will "hasten
the return of more than 8,000 Somalis being held in the United States who are
subject to deportation or are awaiting hearings").
168. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/dro/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2005) (relating the
Office of Detention and Removal's mission as "promot[ing] public safety and
national security by ensuring the departure from the United States of all removable
aliens through the fair and effective enforcement of the nation's immigration
laws").
169. Jodi Wilgoren, Refugees in Limbo: Ordered Out of U.S., but With
Nowhere to Go, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2005, at Al; see also A. Gaffar Peang-Meth,
Immigration Law Leaves Certain Detainees in Legal Twilight Zone, PAC. DAILY
NEWS, July 13, 1005 at 20A (quoting a member of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association as stating "[ilt's a serious problem because there's nowhere to
send them, and if there's nowhere to send them, they go into this strange limbo."
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the domestic concerns regarding immigration and terrorism, the
Court's ruling that acceptance is not necessary when selecting a
country for removal under §1231(b)(2)(E) may become much more
important.
A. Judicial Impact
The most logical judicial impact of the Jama v. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement decision is the effect it will have on pending
lawsuits involving Somali refugees who have been ordered removed
by the United States government. 170  In many of these cases, the
judge has decided to postpone removal to Somalia, the refugees'
country of origin, due to the lack of functioning government and the
risk of further injury or death upon arrival. Immediately after the
handing dowi of this decision, these immigrants found that they no
longer had a defense to their removal to Somalia because the Court
ruled that their humanitarian concerns were not sufficient to preclude
removal. 17' Therefore, it is likely that there will be more actions to
deport removable aliens to their country of origin, regardless of the
political condition of that country, as well as a greater likelihood of
class action lawsuits brought to remove large numbers of removable
aliens. 17
2
The article also poses the question for the government of "[w]hat to do with people
who have no legal right to stay, yet no political route out").
170. See, e.g. Farah v. Gonzalez, 140 Fed. Appx. 406 (3d Cir. 2005); Ali v.
Gonzalez, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005); Jama v. Gonzalez, ,431 F.3d 230 (5th Cir.
2005).
171. See Jama, 543 U.S. at 348 (majority opinion) (stating that an acceptance
requirement is unnecessary for the Attorney General to consider conditions of the
destination country because other measures such as asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief from torture exist).
172. Many circuits have already implemented the decision from the Jama case
in ordering that concerns regarding the lack of a central government will not stand
to preclude the Government from deporting aliens back to Somalia. See Jama v.
Gonzalez, 431 F.3d at 231 (stating that "we conclude that Somalia's unwillingness
or inability to consent in advance to appellants' removal did not preclude their
removal to Somalia as the country of their birth."). In Al v. Gonzalez, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that:
In Ali v. Ashcroft . . . we held that the United States cannot
remove aliens to Somalia because 8 U.S.C. §1231 does not
permit removal if the country does not have a functioning
Accepting the Unacceptable
An example of the judicial impact is the Ali v. Ashcroft case, in
which approximately 4,000 Somali refugees, all of whom deportable,
now find themselves subject to removal after the Jama decision." 3
The Ali case involved a class action lawsuit against 4,000 refugees in
Seattle, Washington, whose removal orders had been disregarded due
to the lack of functioning government in Somalia to accept the
aliens. 17 4 However, the government appealed, arguing that there was
no acceptance requirement and the fact that there was no central
government to accept the aliens should not preclude their removal. 75
Therefore, as a result of Jama, each of those immigrants now faces
removal back to Somalia, a country with no government where they
fear for their lives daily.176 This case is just one example that shows
the potential impact of the Jama decision upon those who are fearful
of returning to their country of origin, and the drawn-out legal battles
that may ensue.
B. Administrative Impact
The Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ruling may
government to accept the aliens .... The Supreme Court
subsequently held that Somalia's inability to accept a person does
not preclude the alien's removal from the United States ....
Jama thus has fore-closed the claim that the Government may not
remove aliens to Somalia.
Ali, 421 F.3d at 796. Therefore, the majority of deportable Somali refugees who
have not been removed because of the earlier interpretation of § 1231 are now
subject to removal. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. It was not until the Jama decision, when the Court veered sharply
from the interpretation it had implemented for decades, that the preclusion of
removing to Somalia was overturned. See Jama, 543 U.S. at 348.
176. See Darryl Fears and Mary Beth Sheridan, Court Rules Against the
Detention of Cubans; Justices Back Deportation of Somali, WASH. POST, Jan. 13,
2005, at A12 (quoting Nick Gellert, attorney for the Somali refugees, stating that
"it would be our sincere hope that Homeland Security doesn't proceed to remove
people to Somalia under the current conditions there.. .It's not just a matter of legal
principle.. .It's a matter of humanitarian issues." In addition, a local Somali leader,
Yusuf Ahmed, alluded to the affect on local Somali's by stating "[t]here is no
government back home. The refugees who come here run for their lives. I'm sure
that when they go back, they will be facing harsh situations of killing, raping or bad
things.").
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have great impact upon the administrative law system of deportation
and removal. The Department of Homeland Security, which has
come into existence since this case was initially filed within the court
system, has delegated the authority of alien removal to the Office of
Detention and Removal. 7 7  The main goal of this Office is to
facilitate the timely removal of deportable aliens in order to maintain
and secure the safety of the United States.' 78 However, one of the
primary issues impeding this mission has been raised by the attempts
to remove Keyse Jama subsequent to the Jama ruling: even though
the Government may legally remove an alien to a country without
that country's acceptance, it cannot force them to physically accept
our unwanted alien.' 7 9 Due to this logistical quandary, it appears that
the newly formed Department of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement will face additional backlog and confusion when
determining where to send removable aliens who simply are not
accepted by the attempted destination country. 181 In fact, the Jama
177. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/factsheetsl00604ice.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2006). The Department of Immigration and Customs Enforcement was established
on March 1, 2003 as part of the Department of Homeland Security. Id. The
Department of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is headed by Assistant
Secretary Michael Garcia, who has the authority over immigration and customs
issues. Id. The Office of Detention and Removal is a subset within the ICE that
deals specifically with matters concerning the process of alien removal. Id.
178. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 168.
Officially, the goal of the DRO is to promote public safety and national security by
"provid[ing] adequate and appropriate custody management to support removals, to
facilitate the processing of illegal aliens through the immigration court, and to
enforce their departure from the United States." Id.
179. See supra note 179-80 and accompanying text.
180. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 168. This raises
further questions regarding the international humanitarian issues invoked through
simply returning aliens to their native countries regardless of potential danger.
Justice Souter alludes to this issue when he discusses the ability for aliens to be
"airdropped surreptitiously" into a country that has refused their entry. Jama, 543
U.S. at 364 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting). Even the Department of Homeland
Security has acknowledged that there existed "ongoing armed conflict within
Somalia that would pose a serious threat to the personal safety of returning
nationals of Somalia (or aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in
Somalia). See Extension of the Designation of Somalia Under Temporary
Protected Status Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 139 (July 21, 2003). It has generally been
the policy of the United States Government to not conflict with international law,
decision appears to do little to clarify how to deal with and remove
such aliens, and further complicates the process of deportation.'81
In addition to the judicial impact of forcing many thousands of
refugees to now return to their country of origin, there is the equally
important logistical dilemma of how the United States will deliver
said aliens.'82 For example, approximately four months after the
Court made its ruling, the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency (ICE) unsuccessfully attempted to remove
Jama to Puntland, Somalia.' 83  The dissenting opinion, written by
Justice Souter, alludes to this difficulty when stating that "even
though a government has actually refused acceptance of a removable
person . . . the person could be airdropped surreptitiously into that
same country."'18 4 This begs the very difficult and puzzling question
of how the Court foresees removal to countries who do not accept the
aliens that the United States is attempting to remove. 185 It can be
and therefore not return aliens to their native country when harm or injury may
result. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 39, at 42. However, it appears that after
the Jama ruling, the United States is free to neglect international law, which may
seriously strain the United States' relations with other foreign nations.
181. As a result of the ruling, the Office of Removal and Detention now has
even more destination options, which may appear more attractive than unrelated
countries, but pose much greater risk and difficulty to effectuate. As was the case
with Keyse Jama, it make take much more time and resources to attempt to remove
an alien to their native country without acceptance than simply removing them to
another country that does acquiesce. This process is further complicated after the
Zadvydas v. Davis ruling, which held that the United States government may not
detain an alien for more than six months unless there is a "reasonable likelihood"
of removal in the near future. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
182. See Eric Black, Somalia Refuses to Admit Deported Refugee; The United
States Had Been Trying to Send Keyse Jama Away for Four Years, STAR TRIBUNE,
Apr. 23, 2005 at 7A (detailing the difficulties in removing an alien after the Jama
decision stating that acceptance is not necessary).
183. See id. The ICE had hired two men to fly Jama from Kenya to the
autonomous state of Puntland, Somalia, in order to drop him into his country of
origin. Id. However, Puntland officials did not respect the legality of Jama's
removal, and therefore wouldn't accept him, requiring the ICE to transport him
back and replace him in custody. Id. In addition to this attempt, there have also
been attempts to deliver him to Bossasso, a port city of Puntland, in order to reunite
him with members of his clan, however that has also proved difficult. Id.
184. Jama, 543 U.S. at 364 n. 10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. See Wilgoren, supra note 169 at Al. According to Manny Van Pelt, the
spokesman for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "[i]t can be
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expected that there will be much trial and error in determining the
best manner of removing such aliens, in order to deliver them safely
and effectively from the United States.
In addition to the logistical difficulties presented by the Jama
decision, the Department of Homeland Security may also face a
severe increase in workload and backlog due to appeals of new
removal orders. Now that there is no acceptance required, thousands
of aliens from China, Cuba, Vietnam and Cambodia are in the
position of being removed to their country of origin, against their
will, even though they were originally irremovable.' 8 6 In addition to
the potential appeals of new removal orders and destinations, the
Department of Homeland Security may also be faced with additional
appeals and backlog each time a deportation is attempted and refused
by the destination country, as was the case with Keyse Jama.' 87 The
potential for increased workload and complications for the
Department of Homeland Security as an administrative agency is
very probable, which may in turn have adverse affects on the security
and safety of the United States.
Another manner in which the Jama decision may impact the
administrative processes of the Department of Homeland Security
concerns the subject of terrorism, and alien terrorists, which is an
extremely important concern in current society. The ruling set forth
by the Supreme Court may have a positive impact on the safety of the
United States by allowing the Government to remove any harmful or
very challenging removing people to these countries ... [t]he American public
thinks it's just putting a person on a plane and letting him go." Id. When asked
about how quickly such deportations would occur, a spokesperson for the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement said the agency was still examining the
ruling, but did not allude to any specific timeframe. Florangela Davila, Ruling
Could Lead to Deportations, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005 at B3.
186. See Donald M. Kerwin, Throwing Away the Key: Lifers in INS Custody,
75 INTERPRETER RELEASE 649, 650-52 (1998).
187. See supra note 178-80 and accompanying text. Each time a deportation
to a country which has refused acceptance is attempted and rebuffed by that
country, the alien being detained may appeal that detention, as well as the length of
time they have been detained. It is inevitable that there are going to be more and
more refusals, as the United States Government is now encouraged to return aliens
to those countries that are unwilling to accept them. Those aliens who are subject
to removal "can attest to the practical difficulty, if not impossibility, of acting
anyway when a request is refused." Jama v. I.N.S., 329 F.3d at 637 (Bye, J.,
dissenting).
dangerous alien to the country of their origin, without having to
secure that country's acceptance before doing so.' 88 However, this
new ability to simply return dangerous aliens to their countries of
origin worries many, as it would nullify the United States' ability to
detain and monitor them, and would therefore allow them to resume
their terror-laden activities.' 89 There are valid arguments for both
removing or continuing to monitor 'dangerous' aliens and there is
potential for the Department of Homeland Security to elect either
approach as the one they will implement when removing those aliens
suspected of terrorist activity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in the Jama v. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement case will have ramifications reaching far
beyond the impact of the petitioner Keyse Jama. The decision will
impact the lives of thousands of aliens in the United States, most
notably and imminently those from Somalia awaiting deportation.
Although both the majority and dissent laid out very strong
arguments for the interpretation they had wished to see, it was the
majority's desire to strictly interpret the text of the statute that
prevailed. Given the current climate of our country with regards to
immigration and our concerns with national safety, the decision of
this case appears to be very timely. It will have great impact on our
ability to remove those aliens deemed harmful or dangerous, and
gives greater latitude to potential destinations for such removals.
However, neither the majority nor dissent touched upon how this
would directly impact the war on terrorism, or how it would affect
our relationships with other world powers. Is it possible that an
easier removal process not requiring acceptance may be more
188. See Darryl Fears and Mary Beth Sheridan, Court Rules Against Detention
of Cubans; Justices Back Deportation of Somali, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at
A12 (stating that the inability to remove aliens to Somalia would be concerning in
light of that country's link to terrorism).
189. See 8 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(2)(C) (2005) (granting the Attorney General the
ability to continue detaining alien's suspected of terrorism when "no country is
willing to receive such an alien" until an accepting country is found. This
continued detention allows the Government to monitor their activities and maintain
the safety of the United States).
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detrimental to national security than simply detaining them until
there is a country that is willing to receive them? Will other nations
become agitated at the United States use of power when simply
"dumping" harmful or unwanted aliens upon those countries less
equipped to protest, therefore increasing disdain for the United
States? The policies utilized by the Department of Homeland
Security and the decisions of lower courts following this standard
may have an incredible impact upon national security and foreign
relations for years to come.
